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RECENT TRENDS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
HIRING Ex-CONVICTS

Suitable employment following release from
prison is a vital element in the rehabilitation of
ex-convicts.' Several studies indicate that unemployment is among the principal causal factors of
recidivism.' Upon release from prison, an ex-convict
faces substantial job discrimination by both private
and public emplo ,ers, and by statutes which restrict
ex-convicts from obtaining licenses to practice various state-regulated trades and professions.' Some
effort has been made to provide protection to job
applicants handicapped by arrest records. For example,Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been
held to pcevent employers from absolutely barring
job applicants from employment on the basis of
arrest records.4 But the apparently closer connection
between a criminal conviction and fitness for employment has traditionally justified numerous laws and
1
D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND
PAROLE SYSTEM 7 (1964); Klinge, Expungement of Crimi-

nal Convictions in Kansas: A Necessary Rehabilitative
Too!, 13 WASHBURN L.J. 93, 105 (1974).
2
D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND
PAROLE SYSTEM 329 (1964); G. POWNAL, EMiPLOYMENT
PROBLEMIS
OF RELEASED PRISONERS 4 (1969).
3

E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 12(a) (2) (B) (1970) (Secretary of
Agriculture may refuse to register futures commission
merchants and floor brokers who have been convicted of a
felony in a state or federal court); 29 U.S.C. § 504(a)
(1970) (no person convicted of a listed felony can serve as an
employee of a labor organization for five years following
conviction); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 475(a) (2) (West
Supp. 1975) (provision allowing the suspension or revocation of a license, certificate or registration as a result of a
criminal conviction); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1029 (West Supp.
1975) (convicted felon excluded from employment as a

peace officer). See generally Symposium-The Collateral
Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L.
REV. 929 (1970).
'Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401
(C.D. Cal. 1970), affd, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972). The

court held that the race-specific effect of such bans violated
the proscription of racially discriminatory employment
practices contained in the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) et seq. The Act provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire ... or otherwise

to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.
Equal Employment Opportunity Act § 703(a) (1), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1970).

private employment practices which have excluded
ex-convicts from public and private employment.
During the past few years, there has been some
judicial and legislative activity designed, at least in
part, to weaken the barriers to employment which
confront ex-convicts. In Green v. Missouri PacificR.
R. ', the Eighth Circuit has held that an employer
who absolutely bars ex-convicts from employment is
practicing racial discrimination in violation of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6
The racially discriminatory character of the absolute employment barriers faced by ex-convicts is
predicated upon the fact that blacks are disproportionately represented in the class of ex-convicts;7
and consequently, blacks suffer disproportionately
when employers absolutely refuse to hire ex-convicts.
This analysis roughly parallels the reasoning of a
1970 case, Gregory v. Litton Industries, Inc., 8 in
which the Ninth Circuit held that the exclusion from
employment of applicants with records of multiple
arrests constituted racial discrimination, in violation
of Title VII, because black applicants were substantially more likely to have arrest records than were
white applicants. In the Green case, the Eighth
Circuit has essentially adapted the rationale of
the Gregory case to the situation involving ex-convicts by finding that even the connection between a
criminal conviction and lack of fitness for employment cannot automatically be assumed in a Title VII
case; the relationship must be demonstrated by the
employer.
Title VII explicitly prohibits employers from
denying employment opportunities to individuals on
the basis of race. 9 However, courts have interpreted
the Act to prohibit employment decisions based on
any criterion which would have even an indirect
discriminatory impact on the basis of race, color,
1523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'g 381 F. Supp.
992 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
'See note 4 supra.
7
The district court received expert testimony that, in
urban areas, from 36.9 per cent to 78.1 per cent of all black
persons would incur a conviction during their lifetimes, but
that from only 11.6 per cent to 16.8 per cent of all white
persons would acquire a conviction. Green v. Missouri
Pacific R. R., 381 F. Supp. 992, 995 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
8472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
'See note 6 supra.
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religion, sex, or national origin. 10 Because of the
disproportionate number of blacks who have records
of arrest or conviction, any employment criterion
based on either arrest or conviction records could
potentially have the necessary racial impact to britig
it within the scope of Title VII. To state a claim
under the Act, an individual affected by a discriminatory employment practice must make a prima facie
showing that the practice has a discriminatory
impact on a basis which is prohibited by the Act. It
then becomes the employer-defendant's burden to
show the business necessity of the practice." Such a
showing requires that the employer demonstrate that
the practice serves some necessary business purpose,
and that no less discriminatory practice would
sufficiently serve that purpose.
Green v. Missouri PacificR.R. involved the denial
of employment to a job applicant, Green, with a
single conviction for refusing military induction.
Green alleged that Missouri Pacific's rule against
hiring ex-convicts disproportionately disqualified
black applicants. The district court held that Green
had failed to make a prima facie showing of racial
discrimination because the number of job applicants
affected by the rule was not significant, 12and because
the Missouri Pacific had adopted its policy of
excluding ex-convicts without any intentional racial
bias. The court of appeals in Gregory v. Litton
Industries, Inc. had made clear, however, that
employer intent was not the test of discrimination
under Title VII. 3 That case involved a job applicant, Gregory, who had been denied employment on
"Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401
C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
(discrimination based on arrest record was racial discrimination because black applicants were more likely to have
arrest records).
1
The plaintiff in a Title VII case may establish a prima
facie case of racial discrimination by showing:
(1) that he belongs to a racial minority,
(2) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants,
(3) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected,
and
(4) that, after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants
from persons of complainant's qualifications.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
"Out of 8,488 applicants between September 1971 and
November 1973, only 174 black applicants (2.05 per cent)
were rejected on the basis of conviction records, which the
district court characterized as a de minimis racial impact.
Green v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 381 F. Supp. 992, 996
(E.D. Mo. 1974).
"Gregory v. Litton Industries, Inc., 472 F.2d 631, 632
(9th Cir. 1972), citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971).

the basis of his record of fourteen arrests (no
convictions). Noting that blacks comprise eleven
per cent of the national population but account for 27
per cent of the reported arrests, the court found that
an employer's policy of barring from employment
applicants with records of numerous arrests was
prima facie discrimination under Title VII. Litton's
employment policy was racially discriminatory despite the facts that the policy was racially neutral on
its face, that the policy had not been applied
discriminatorily, and that the employer had no intent
to discriminate.
Following the precedent of Gregory v. Litton
Industries, Inc., '" and similar Title VII cases, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the
district court decision in Green v. Missouri Pacific
R.R. and held that Green's purely statistical analysis
of the impact of the employer's practice was a prima
facie showing of racial discrimination; " blacks
were excluded from employment because of prior
convictions at over two and one-half times the rate at
which whites were being excluded. 16 The fact that
relatively few applicants had conviction records and
were affected by Missouri Pacific's policy was not
controlling because the effect remained significantly
discriminatory. The test adopted in Green was
whether the employer intentionally used an employment policy which discriminates in fact between
applicants of different races. 17
The court having thus found a prima facie case of
racial discrimination, the railroad had the burden to
show that the practice of excluding ex-convicts from
employment fulfilled a business necessity. "Although
the district court in Green had disposed of the case by
finding no racial discrimination, it considered the
business necessity issue and agreed with the railroad's contention that the considerations which led to
the policy of excluding ex-convicts from employment
were "relevant" to the safety and efficiency of the
railroad's business. Missouri Pacific contended that,
by hiring ex-convicts, the company would expose
itself to the risk of employee theft, disruptioa of
IISee note 10 supra.
"A purely statistical demonstration can be enough to
make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination. Carter
v. Gallegher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 950 (1972).
"6One hundred seventy-four of 3,282 black applicants
(5.3 per cent) were rejected automatically on the basis of
conviction records, whereas 118 of 5,206 white applicants
(2.23 per cent) were summarily rejected because of conviction records.
"Green v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th
Cir. 1975).
'"Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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employment due to recidivism, 19 liability for hiring
people with known violent tendencies, and the
difficulty of bonding ex-convicts. However, the court
of appeals held that the railroad had failed to show a
business necessity for its policy. The appropriate test
of such a policy is not whether the hiring criteria are
"relevant," but whether they are "essential" to the
safety and efficiency of the business, and whether no
less discriminatory policy could achieve the same
purpose. 2 The employer must make such a showing
of business necessity with empirical evidence rather
than mere allegations. 2" In fact, the railroad presented no empirical evidence to show that hiring
ex-convicts would adversely affect its business; no
objective evidence was adduced by the railroad to
show that the supposed consequences of hiring
ex-convicts would actually follow. Consequently, the
court of appeals held that the railroad's policy of
absolutely excluding ex-convicts from employment
violated the Title VII restriction against racially
discriminatory hiring practices. Nevertheless, despite
the railroad's failure to produce any objective evidence relating criminal records to job performance,
the court acknowledged that in some cases a particular conviction might be predictive of job performance.
Under such circumstances, an employer would apparertly be entitled to take an ex-convict's record
into account as a matter of business necessity. The
court suggested that such a case would be presented
by a convicted embezzler applying for a position
which involved handling large sums of money.
The fourteenth amendment has led some courts to
essentially the same result in cases involving statutory discrimination against ex-convicts who apply for
licenses or public employment. Although Title VII
reaches public as well as private employment discrimination, an ex-convict might be forced to rely on
the fourteenth amendment if he could not claim to be
the victim of racial discrimination, 2 2 or if he had
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with
state and federal agencies enforcing fair employment
practices legislation. In Butts v. Nichols,2 3 an exconvict was absolutely barred from civil service
employment by state law. 24 The plaintiff's Title VII
"The argument that an employer is justified in refusing to hire an ex-convict because recidivism creates employment problems seems somewhat circular in that unemployment is a principal cause of recidivism. See note 2
supra.
2
United States v. St. Louis S.F. Ry., 464 F.2d 301,308
(8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973).
2129 C.F.R. §§ 1607.6, .7, .13 (1974).
22
See note 6 supra.
2'381 F. Supp. 573 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
24
IOWA CODE § 365.17(5) (1971).
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argument claiming racial discrimination in employment was dismissed by the court because the plaintiff
had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
under the Act. Reaching the plaintiff's equal protection argument, the court held that the state did not
have to show a compelling state interest to bar
ex-convicts from public employment. A compelling
state interest is required to satisfy the requirements
of equal protection only where the plaintiff is a
member of a class which is discriminated against on
the basis of a suspect criterion (e.g., race), or where
the discrimination interferes with fundamental
rights. 2"
The court refused to consider discrimination
against ex-convicts to be equivalent to discrimination
on the basis of race, a suspect criterion, merely
because the percentage of black prisoners exceeded
the percentage of blacks in the national population.
The court also held that the right to civil service
employment was not a fundamental right. Consequently, the state's absolute felon-bar to public
employment only had to satisfy the rational basis
test. Nevertheless, the court held the absolute felonbar to be an unconstitutional violation of equal
protection. Although the state could refuse employment in certain positions where the felony conviction
would directly reflect on the ex-felon's qualifications,
an across-the-board prohibition against the employment of ex-felons, without tailoring to limit the ban
to situations where the felony conviction reflected on
job qualification, did not meet the rational basis
test.26 This equal protection test of felon-bans is very
similar to the business necessity test of Title VII;
and, as in cases under Title VII, the decision would
not entirely prohibit the state from considering an
ex-convict's record in making employment decisions. 27
Additional help for ex-convicts seeking employment may derive from recent state and federal
legislative activity. At both levels, legislatures have
passed or are considering laws to regulate the
maintenance and distribution of criminal records.
The United States Senate is considering two bills,
premised upon the individual's right of privacy,
which are designed to regulate the handling of
criminal records by federal agencies. 28 A number of
F. Supp. at 579.
1d. Accord, Watson v. Cronin, 384 F. Supp. 652 (D.
Colo. 1974) (approving official's rationally based refusal to
2"381
2

grant a press pass to an ex-convict employed by a
magazine).
2
United States v. Chesterfield Cty. Sch. Dist., 484
F.2d
28 70 (4th Cir. 1973).
S. 2963, S. 2964, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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state legislatures have passed various statutes to
provide for the expungement of criminal records as a
method of dealing with their misuse. Although
aimed generally at arrest records, especially those
arrests not followed by prosecution or conviction,
such laws would restore somewhat the social status of
ex-convicts by relieving some of the employment
discrimination that generally attaches to a criminal
conviction. A recent Kansas statute expressly allows
an ex-convict whose conviction record has been
expunged to deny on an employment application that
he was ever convicted of the crime.29 But such
legislation only indirectly affects the employment
problems of ex-convicts by preventing prospective
employers from having easy access to the criminal
records of job applicants. Expungement statutes do
not directly restrict an employer from arbitrarily
discriminating against ex-convicts in the hiring process.
Few states have provided explicit protection for
the employment rights of ex-convicts. 30 Possibly, as
suggested by the executive director of the American
Civil Liberties Union, " . .. the legal attack
[against felon-bans] will focus on the racially discriminatory impact of denying employment on the
basis of conviction records."'' 3 The racial impact of
such employment practices provides the basis for
applying Title VII and its enforcment apparatus to
2

KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4616, -4617 (1974). The
statute provides not only for expungement of criminal records, but also that:
In any application for employment, license or other
civil right or privilege, or any appearance as a witness, a person whose conviction of crime has been expunged under this statute may state that he has never
been convicted of such crime.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4717 (c) (1974).

"0Hawaii Employment Relations Act gives discrimination on the basis of conviction records the same status as
discrimination on the basis of race:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice or unlawful discrimination,
(1) for an employer to refuse to hire or employ or to
bar or discharge from employment, any individual because of his race, sex, age, religion, color, ancestry or
arrest and court [conviction] record which does not
have a substantial relationship to the functions and responsibilities of the prospective or continued employment.
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 378-2 (Supp. 1974).

Montana has amended its constitution to restore rights
to an ex-convict:
Laws for the punishment of crime shall be founded on
the principles of prevention and reformation. Full
rights are restored by termination of state supervision
for any offense against the state.
MONT. CONsT. Art. II, § 28.
"1A. NEIER, DOSSIER 117-18 (1975).

the employment problems of the ex-convict. In view
of the vigorous enforcement given to the provisions
of Title VII of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act, Title VII may become the major vehicle for
winning employment opportunities for ex-convicts.
DANGEROUS

SPECIAL OFFENDER

Congress passed the Organized Crime Control Act
in 1970" 2 in an effort to curtail the operation of
organized crime.23 From the beginning, Title X of
the Act has drawn criticism for its dubious
constitutionality." Title X authorizes a sentencing
judge to substantially increase the term of imprisonment of a convicted felon beyond the normal term for
the crime if the.judge finds, without benefit of jury
determination, that the convict is a "dangerous"
"special offender" within the meaning of the Act.
The District Court for the Northern District of
Texas recently held, in United States v. Holt, " that
Title X does not violate a convict's constitutional
guarantees of due process of law. The court explicitly rejected the reasoning of an earlier Missouri
case, United States v. Duardi, " in which the
Missouri court held that Title X violated due process
in the sentencing procedure. Rather than representing inconsistent holdings as the Holt court seemed to
allege, the cases may be distinguished.
Under Title X, a sentencing judge who finds, by
only a preponderence of the information, that a
convicted felon is both a "special offender" and
"dangerous" may increase or enhance the felon's
sentence up to a maximum of twenty-five years."7
The definition of special offender is designed to reach
criminals who are engaged in organized crime. The
class includes (1) the recidivist, whose felony was
part of a history of felony convictions, (2) the
professional criminal, whose felony was part of a
U.S.C. §§ 3575-78 (1970).
H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970),
as cited in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4074
(1970)
(remarks of Rep. Dennis of Indiana).
34
3218
33

!d.

"5397 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
"6384 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
3718 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1970). Under this section when
there is a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or a guilty
verdict of such felony, the court sitting without a jury shall
hold a hearing before sentence is imposed. At this time,
defendant and counsel for defendant may inspect the
presentence report and cross examine witnesses. If it
appears by a preponderance of the information that the
defendant is a dangerous special offender, the court shall
sentence the defendant to imprisonment for an appropriate
term not in excess of twenty-five years and not disproportionate in severity to the maximum term otherwise authorized by law for such felony.

COMMENVTS
pattern of criminal conduct in which the felon
exhibits special skill and which provides a substantial
source of his income, and (3) the conspirator, whose
conviction is for conspiracy to engage in a pattern of
criminal conduct. 3 8 Such a criminal is "dangerous" if
the judge also finds that a period of confinement
longer than that provided for the underlying felony is
required for the protection of the public. The Holt
case involved the sentencing of a twenty-nine year old
who had a ten-year record of felony convictions,
including an armed robbery for which he had been
sentenced by the state to a nintey-nine year prison
term. The recurrent felony offenses were the basis of
the court's finding that Holt was a special offender;
his overall record, lack of employment history and
drug addiction led the court to hold that he was also
dangerous. Finding no constitutional infirmities with
Title X, the court extended Holt's sentence as
provided by the Act.
The determination under Title X that a defendant
is a dangerous special offender raises essentially two
due process issues: first, whether "dangerous" as
defined by the statute is too vague or overbroad; and
second, whether the determination of dangerous
special offender status involves fact-finding by the
court which infringes upon the defendant's right to
be tried by a jury and judged by the reasonable doubt
standard rather than by the sentencing hearing
standard of the preponderence of the information.
With respect to the first problem, the court in United
States v. Duardi held that the standard of dangerousness was unconstitutionally vague. The government
had asked the court to find that Duardi was a threat
to public safety on the basis of allegations that he was
connected with organized crime and that he had
conspired with others in an attempt to murder a
government witness."s The court felt that to substantially increase Duardi's prison term on the basis
of such allegations would be tantamount to convicting him for being "dangerous," which was too im5818 U.S.C. §§ 3575(e) (1), (2), (3) (1970). See H.R.
REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), as cited in 2
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4038 (1970). Under
this section a defendant is a special offender if the defendant
has previously been convicted under various circumstances,
has committed a felony as part of a pattern of conduct which
was criminal under the applicable laws of any jurisdiction,
which constituted a substantial source of his income, and in
which he manifested special skill or expertise, or the felony
was or the defendant committed it in furtherance of a
conspiracy with three or more other persons to engage in a
pattern of conduct criminal under applicable laws of any
jurisdiction.
39
United States v. Duardi, 384 F. Supp. 874, 878
(W.D. Mo. 1974).
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precise a standard to be a category of criminal conduct. " The court in United States v. Holt noted,
however, that the determination of dangerousness
was properly a part of a sentencing proceeding; the
court's role was to sentence the convict appropriately
for the underlying conviction rather than for being
dangerous. Although "dangerousness" is too vague
for a standard defining criminal conduct, the court
felt that the term need not be that specific merely to
be considered in determining the appropriate treatment for a convicted defendant. The Holt court relied upon cases which have held that a court could
constitutionally deny bail pending appeal to a convict which the court found to be dangerous. 41
The second due process issue raised by Title X
actually underlies the Duardi court's finding that
"dangerousness" was too vague a standard for enhancing criminal sentences under the Act. In order
to establish that a felon qualifies as a dangerous special offender, the court must act as a fact-finder in the
sentencing proceeding, and the prescribed standard
of proof is the preponderence of the information
rather than beyond a reasonable doubt. 4 2 To find
that a felon is dangerous, the court must decide that
an extended sentence is necessary in order to protect
the public. To find that the defendant is also a special
offender, the court must find that the felony was part
of a pattern of crime from which the felon derives
substantial income, or that the felony was a conspiracy to engage in a pattern of criminal conduct, or that
the felon has committed several serious felonies.
Consequently, the over-all sentencing process prescribed by Title X involves more than traditional
4
"Id. at 885, citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S.
451 (1939).
"The cases which the court cited were considering a
provision of the Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §
3148 (1970), which provides in part that:
[Ifi] the court or judge has reason to believe that no
one or more conditions of release will reasonably assure that the person will not flee or pose a danger to
any other person or to the community ... the person
may be ordered detained.
Sellers v. United States, 89 S.Ct. 36 (1968) (by Black, J.,
as individual Justice, decision on application for bail pending appeal) (defendant who was convicted of nonrviolent
crime, failure to submit for induction, was not dangerous);
Russell v. United States, 402 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(convicted defendant was denied bail pending appeal on
the basis of his history of convictions indicating that he was
dangerous to the community); United States v. Nelson,
346 F. Supp. 926 (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd, 467 F.2d 944
(5th Cir. 1972) (defendant found to be dangerous and held
without bail where he was convicted of a narcotics violation
while on bond from a prior narcotics conviction).
'218 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1970).
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consideration of a felon's undisputed personal
history. 43 In United States v. Duardi, the government sought to have the defendant's sentence enhanced in part on the basis of information that
Duardi had conspired to commit murder. The court
held that to increase Duardi's sentence on that basis
would be equivalent to convicting him of the conspiracy without due process, without trial by jury and
based on the preponderence of the information rather
than beyond a reasonable doubt based on evidence.
The Supreme Court considered an analogous
situation in Specht v. Patterson." Under the Colorado Sex Offenders Act, a felon convicted of certain
sex offenses could have his sentence enhanced if, in
the court's opinion, the offender represented a threat
of bodily harm to the public at large. The Supreme
Court held that such a statute ".

.

.makes

one

conviction the basis for commencing another proceeding under another Act to determine whether a
person constitutes a threat of bodily harm to the
public.... That is a new finding of fact.. .that
was not an ingredient of the offense charged." " As a
result, such a proceeding requires more protection
for the defendant's constitutional rights than is found
in an ordinary sentencing hearing. In fact, the
Organized Crime Control Act does provide specific
protection for the defendant's rights to be represented by counsel, to inspect presentence reports, to
cross-examine witnesses and to the benefit of compulsory process.

46

However, even such explicit guarantees were not
sufficient to save the statute in United States v.
Duardi. There the government wanted the judge
to find that the defendant was a special offender based on information which, if true, would
itself constitute a separate criminal act-conspiracy
to commit murder. If such allegations could be used
to establish that a defendant was a special offender
and consequently liable for enhanced sentencing,
"3 No limitation shall be placed on the information
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a
person convicted of an offense which a court of the United
States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing
an appropriate sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1970).
44386 U.S. 605 (1967).
5
" Id. at 608.
4618 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1970).

the court felt that the sentencing proceeding would
effectively become a trial, without the full due process
guarantees which a trial affords to a defendant.
Although the court in United States v. Holt disagreed
with Duardi, the Holt court was faced with a more
traditional situation where the government had
established Holt's special offender status on the basis
of his record of felony convictions. The court was not
asked to find facts relating to patterns of criminal
conduct or alleged organized crime connections;
rather, the court was asked to consider Holt's
recidivism, which Title X also allows as the basis for
special offender status. As a result, although Holt
upholds the constitutionality of Title X, the court
was faced with an easier case than that which faced
the Duardicourt.
The constitutionality of Title X is apparently
related to the extent to which a court is called upon to
act as fact-finder in an enhanced sentencing proceeding. A defendant's constitutional rights are not
violated in a traditional sentencing proceeding where
a court, relying on a presentence report unconstrained by rules of evidence, may vary a defendant's
sentence from one to twenty years. 4 However, to the
extent that fact-finding involves information which is
essentially the basis of a new criminal charge leading
to punishment in an enhanced sentencing proceeding, traditional due process safeguards must be
observed. 4 An additional problem is that every Title
X case will also involve judicial fact-finding relating
to the defendant's dangerousness, and similar provisions in enhanced sentencing statutes have been
held unconstitutional for that reason. I Cases which
have upheld the denial of bail on the basis of a defendant's dangerousness are not relevant because
the severity of the punishment provided by Title X is far greater than merely a denial of bail,
and the severity of possible punishment facing the
defendant in a proceeding is a major factor in testing
the sufficiency of due pr9cess safeguards. "
"'Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
48Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Gerchman
v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302 (1966).
49Id.
5

°District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 639
(1937).
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